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OKLAHOMA
Mark D. Christiansen†
I. NON-OPERATOR V. OPERATOR AND OTHER OIL AND GAS
OPERATIONS-RELATED CASES
A. The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed two certified questions
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma regarding certain lien and trust fund
rights under applicable statutes.
The case of White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank,
N.A.1 presented two questions of state law certified to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma:
(1) Are the “trust funds” create[d] by Title 42 O.S. § 144.2,
entitled “Creation and Appropriation of Trust Funds for
Payment of Lienable Claims,” limited to obligations due nonoperator joint working interest owners, or do such funds
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.10
†
Mark D. Christiansen is an energy and resources lawyer with the Oklahoma City
litigation firm of Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC.
1. White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., No. 118746, 2020
WL 6142712 (Okla. Oct. 20, 2020).
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include payments due [to] holders of mechanic’s and
materialmen’s liens arising under and perfected by Title 42
O.S. § 144?
(2) Does the Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010 grant an
operator and non-operator working interest owner a lien in
proceeds from purchasers of oil and gas which is prior and
superior to any claim of the holder of a mechanic’s and
materialmen’s lien asserted under Title 42 O.S. § 144?2
The above questions were certified to aid in the bankruptcy court’s
resolution of two particular adversarial proceedings.
The first proceeding sought adjudication of the priority, validity,
and value of approximately 2,000 mechanic’s and materialman’s liens
(“M&M liens”) asserted by seventy-eight unpaid vendors over various
interests held by White Star. The second proceeding sought an order
of the bankruptcy court directing several first purchasers of oil and gas
to turn over approximately two million dollars to White Star—the
money held in suspense after the purchasers received statutory lien
notices from the M&M lien claimants.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered and reformulated the first
certified question instead ask: “Whether the funds held in trust
pursuant to 42 Oklahoma Statutes section 144.2 for payment of
lienable claims created by 42 Oklahoma Statutes section 144 are
limited to joint-interest billing payments received by operators for
services rendered by the lienholders?”3
The Court answered the above reformulated question in the
negative. The Court stated, “Nothing in the text or history of [section]
144.2 limits the types of revenue [that] should be held in trust for
payment of lienable claims.”4 The Court found no basis for White
Star’s assertion that the applicability of section144.2(A) should be
limited to obligations between third-party vendors and operators,
stating that the Court would not imply limitations in the text of a
statute that were not clearly expressed.5
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also answered the second certified
question in the negative. White Star argued that the liens they held and
affiliated, non-operating working interest owners under the Oil and
Gas Owners’ Lien Act (the “Act”) were superior to those held by
M&M lien claimants. However, based on the text and legislative
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. ¶1.
Id. ¶10.
Id.
Id. ¶21.
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history of the Act, the Court found that the M&M lien claimants were
in parity to operators and non-operating working interest owners
pursuant to that Act. Therefore, they were entitled to the same superpriority as White Star and its affiliated non-operating working interest
owners.
In sum, regarding the first question of law certified by the
bankruptcy court, the funds that must be held in trust for payment of
lienable claims pursuant to section 144.2 are not exclusively limited
to joint-interest billing payments received by operators for services
rendered by the lienholders. On the second question, the Court found
that the Act does not grant operators and non-operating working
interest owners a lien in proceeds from the sale of oil and gas, which
is prior and superior to any claim of the holder of a mechanic’s and
materialmen’s lien asserted under section 144.
B. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that if affected landowners
are known, or reasonably discoverable, notice provided by
publication results in an unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction
and a denial of due process.
In Purcell v. Parker,6 both the petitioners-Appellants and the
respondents-appellees owned interests in real property that contained
or abutted Colbert Lake (the “Lake”) in McClain County. They also
owned real property that contained Colbert Creek, which was the sole
source of water that feeds the Lake. Water from the Lake was used for
firefighting, drinking water for livestock, and recreational use for
residents in the area.
On May 10, 2017, the Parkers executed a Right of Entry and
Purchase Access Agreement with Select Energy Services (“Select”).
The agreement allowed Select (or their appointed representatives) the
right of entry and the right of access to their real property for the
purpose of water transfer from the Lake for Select’s drilling and
fracking operations. The respondents sought a permit from the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“OWRB”) to sell water from the
Lake to oil and gas companies for use in fracking operations.
On May 15, 2017, the OWRB issued a provisional temporary permit
to Select without actual notice to the petitioners. The permit allowed
the diversion of 3,200 gallons per minute from a diversion point
located on the Lake for the purpose of oil and gas drilling and mining.

6. Purcell v. Parker, No. 118,328, 2020 WL 5903862 (Okla. Oct. 6, 2020).

2021]

OKLAHOMA

419

The Parkers applied for a long-term surface and stream water permit
to withdraw water from the Lake. Although the petitioners’ family
lived in the area for decades and were known by the Parkers, the
Parkers provided the landowners notice by publication as required by
82 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section 105.11. Because the petitioners
did not timely protest, the OWRB did not hold a hearing or individual
proceeding regarding the Parker’s permit application.
On June 20, 2017, the OWRB issued the stream water permit
authorizing the Parkers to take and use 109 acre-feet of water per
calendar year, at a rate not to exceed 3,360 gallons per minute.
Although the petitioners did not receive actual notice of the permit
applications, the OWRB issued the stream water permit after a
meeting in which the petitioners apparently discovered the permits and
were given five minutes to comment.
On July 20, 2017, the petitioners filed a petition in the District Court
of McClain County. The petitioners’ first claim for relief was for a
declaratory judgment determining the stream use permit invalid based
on insufficient actual notice to the petitioners. Second, the petitioners
sought another declaratory judgment to nullify the temporary permit
for lack of notice to the petitioners. The petitioners’ third and fourth
claims for relief were for judicial review of the stream permit and an
accounting. On October 16, 2017, the petitioners added claims for
conversion and unjust enrichment.
Over a year later, the trial court entered a summary order denying
judicial review of the OWRB proceedings and the constitutional
challenges to the petitioners’ notice pursuant to section 105.11. The
trial court certified its summary order for interlocutory appeal.
Thereafter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the landowners’
petition for certiorari to review the certified interlocutory order to
address the issue of the level of notice constitutionally required in the
proceeding. In particular, the action addressed whether section 105.11
and the rules of the OWRB in conjunction were constitutionally
sufficient. If the notice by publication permit process was not free
from prejudicial error, the permits granted thereunder would be
invalidated.
Title 82 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section 105.11 requires notice by
publication, and the Court found that the specified procedure for
notice by publication was indisputably followed in this case. After
reviewing a series of prior court decisions to provide certain guidance
in the present case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded:
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“[I]f the affected landowners are known, or reasonably
discoverable, notice provided by publication results in
an unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction and a denial
of due process. There is no excuse for failing to give
personal notice of something that directly affects
landowners when such landowners are known or easily
discoverable . . . .”7
The Court reversed the decision below, which granted the water
permit without first providing proper notice and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with the Court’s above decision.
II. LITIGATION OVER ROYALTIES AND OTHER PAYMENTS TO LESSORS
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Peters on her claim that the
underlying oil and gas lease expired due to the lessee’s alleged failure
to make a bonus payment provided for under the lease. The case of
Peters v. EOG Resources, Inc.8 involved an oil and gas lease that
Jacqueline Peters (“Peters”) executed with T.S. Dudley Land
Company, Inc. (“TSDI”) under which TSDI was the lessee. The lease
included an option to extend, which stated:
“Lessee at its sole option may extend the primary term
of this lease for an additional period of [t]wo years by
causing to be delivered to Lessor on or before the
expiration date of the primary term stated hereinabove
an additional bonus payment equal to the bonus per net
mineral acre paid at the execution of the original lease,
which payment shall cover the entire [t]wo-year
term . . . .”9
The oil and gas lease did not include any express terms setting out how
or where TSDI should deliver the bonus payment.
TSDI assigned the subject lease to EOG Resources (“EOG”) in June
2016; however, the record does not address when or if EOG notified
7. Id. ¶24.
8. Disposition of Cases Other Than by Published Opinion, Court Issue
#118,091, 91 OKLA. B. J. 611, 647 (June 19, 2020) (discussing a summary of Peters
v. EOG Resources, Inc.).
9. Appeal from Dist. Ct. McClain Cty, Okla., at 2, Peters v. EOG Resources,
Inc., No. 118.091, (Okla. Civ. App. Jun. 1, 2020).
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Peters that it had acquired the lease. On or before March 1, 2018, EOG
mailed a check for the bonus payment to Peters at the address stated
in the lease. The check was returned as undeliverable on or about
March 15, 2018. On March 22, 2018, EOG sent a second letter to the
same address, asking Peters to verify that the Oklahoma City address
to which the check had been sent was a current address.
After the term of the oil and gas lease expired, Peters’s
granddaughter and attorney-in-fact, Shelli Bradbeary, contacted EOG
about the extension payment. The court’s opinion discussed at length
the gaps in information and the uncertainty as to the factual history
from that point.
On June 22, 2018, Peters filed the present action “to quiet title and
for a determination that EOG had no right, title, or interest in the
minerals subject to the [l]ease. Peters contended that the [l]ease
automatically terminated when the bonus payment was not delivered
to Peters before the end of the primary term of the Lease.”10 Peters and
EOG both moved for summary judgment.
On May 30, 2019, the trial court granted Peters’s motion for
summary judgment and denied EOG’s countermotion for summary
judgment. The trial court stated:
Though the trial court found EOG attempted payment
in good faith and had no notice of Peters’ change in
address, the court found that the Lease required actual
delivery [of the payment] to Peters, and that EOG
failed to show it took any other steps before the Lease
terminated to ascertain Peters’ address, which the court
determined would have been discoverable with
reasonable diligence . . . [T]he court determined that
the Lease automatically terminated, and that the
equitable rule against forfeiture did not apply because
EOG did not show that circumstances outside of its
control prevented timely delivery of the bonus
payment.11
EOG appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals issued a nineteenpage opinion addressing the complex issues presented on appeal. In
addressing the extent of guidance provided under the oil and gas lease,
the Court stated in part as follows:
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 5.
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Here, the Lease contained no terms specifying where
or how payment must be made but only specified that
it be delivered . . . while the lease required that changes
in ownership be provided in writing before the lessee
must take the change into account, the Lease contained
no language requiring Peters to provide written notice
of a change in address to the lessee, nor any term
limiting EOG to delivery only to the address identified
in the preamble of the Lease.12

The Court observed later in its opinion:
[W]e find nothing in the Lease language [that] provides
that EOG’s attempt to deliver payment was sufficient
as a matter of law to extend the Lease term. The trial
court did not err in determining that EOG’s attempted
payment did not in itself extend the Lease . . . .13
Because the Lease was not extended by EOG’s
attempted delivery of payment, the issue before the
trial court was whether the equitable rule against
forfeiture should apply . . . .14
Here, the trial court determined that the Lease
terminated and the equitable rule against forfeiture did
not apply because it concluded that EOG ‘failed to take
any steps to accomplish the timely payment upon
learning the address was incorrect’ and that ‘Plaintiff’s
correct address would have been discoverable with
reasonable diligence.’ First, we find no facts of record
establishing whether EOG could have learned of
Peters’ change in address with reasonable diligence,
and the trial court identified none in its findings . . . .
Nothing of record addresses how EOG would have
obtained Peters’ new address, or whether it could have

12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 12–13.
14. Id. at 13.
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been accomplished before the Lease terminated. This
finding is unsupported by the record.15
The Court concluded in part:
In sum, the material facts of record, even if undisputed,
do not compel a single inference, on which to base
summary judgment, that EOG failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in attempting to make payment,
and was itself responsible for failure to delivery [of the
bonus payment] within the Lease term. Therefore, a
dispute of fact remains on whether the equitable rule of
forfeiture applied to protect EOG from termination of
the Lease.
While it is undisputed that EOG took initial steps to
make payment before the Lease term expired, a
question remains as to whether its steps to make timely
payment were reasonable upon discovery that Peters’
address may not be correct, and whether EOG’s
inability to make timely payment was the fault of a
third party or EOG. We remand this action for the
further proceedings to address these issues . . . .16
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial
court’s May 30, 2019, order granting summary judgment in favor of
Peters.
III. OIL AND GAS LEASE CANCELLATION, TERMINATION AND BREACH
OF OBLIGATION CASES (OTHER THAN ROYALTY)
A. Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that it was undisputed that the
subject well ceased production for more than 120 days and that
required activity to save the leases did not resume.
The lawsuit in Bollenbach v. Spess Oil Company, Inc.17 reached the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals after Spess Oil Company, Inc.
(“Spess”) appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for new trial
15. Id. at 14–15.
16. Id. at 17–18.
17. Disposition of Cases Other Than by Published Opinion, Court Issue
#118,362, 91 OKLA. B. J. 1117, 1167 (Oct. 2, 2020).
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in an action to quiet title and to cancel Spess’s interest in certain oil
and gas leases. This summary of the appellate court’s twenty-page
opinion will only note certain aspects of the court’s discussion.
The plaintiff-mineral owners in this action sought to quiet title to,
or cancel, certain oil and gas leases that allegedly held the Crosswhite
27A well. The plaintiffs asserted that the well had ceased production
in paying quantities, resulting in the termination of certain oil and gas
lease in accordance with their terms.
In the course of detailed proceedings, the trial court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and certified that
ruling for immediate appeal under 12 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section
994(A). Spess subsequently filed a timely application for new trial
alleging various errors in the prior proceedings. The application for
new trial was denied on September 27, 2019, and Spess appealed. The
key rulings from the court of appeals’ lengthy decision are described
below.
First, the court found that the habendum clauses contained in the
subject oil and gas leases provided that the leases would continue in
effect beyond their primary terms as long as oil, gas, or both were
produced—under Oklahoma law this means production in paying
quantities.18 As recent affirmation of this longstanding principle of
Oklahoma oil and gas law, the court noted the decision in Hall v.
Galmor that “[i]n the context of cases where the well was not actually
producing,” the term “produced” means “capable of producing in
paying quantities.” 19
Second, the court of appeals included the following key ruling in its
twenty-one page opinion:
When production in paying quantities ceases under the
terms of a habendum clause, common law allows a
reasonable time for resumption of drilling operations
after a temporary cessation, unless the agreement
contains a cessation of production clause, as in this
case . . . . [The Subject Leases provide] that, if after the
expiration of the primary term, the well “shall be
incapable of producing,” the lease would terminate
unless Spess resumed operations for drilling a well
within 120 days from such cessation.20
18. See Steward v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 858 (Okla. 1979).
19. Hall v. Galmor, 427 P.3d 1052, 1063–64 (Okla. 2018).
20. Appeal from Dist. Ct. Kingfisher Cty, Okla., at 13–14, Bollenbach v. Spess
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Third, Spess argued that it was irrelevant whether the Crosswhite
27A well was producing in paying quantities was irrelevant and that
Spess only needed to show that the well was capable of producing in
paying quantities in order to extend the subject leases. In contrast, the
plaintiffs asserted that the capability of production from the well
would satisfy the habendum clause and prolong the oil and gas leases
only if the well was shut-in. The plaintiffs alleged that if the well was
actively producing, it must produce in paying quantities in order to
satisfy the habendum clauses of the oil and gas leases. In sum, the
plaintiffs contended that the Crosswhite 27A well must have been
producing in paying quantities in order to keep the leases in force and
effect beyond their primary terms.
Fourth, after additional detailed analysis and discussion, the court
of appeals stated that “[i]n short, Spess did not successfully dispute
Plaintiffs’ undisputed material facts that the well ceased production in
paying quantities for a protracted period in 2015 and 2016. The
requirement of continued production in the Habendum Clause was not
satisfied, and the Cessation Clause was therefore triggered.”21
Lastly, the court of appeals found that “the well ceased production
for more than 120 days and that production did not resume . . . [T]he
well was active but not produc[ing] in paying quantities for more than
120 days.”22 The court observed that Spess “supplied no acceptable
evidentiary support to the contrary and presented nothing to support
an equitable argument that the [s]ubject [l]eases should be deemed
capable of production or should not terminate.” 23 The court of appeals
concluded that “[t]he district court did not err in denying [p]laintiffs’
application for new trial after granting summary judgment to
[p]laintiffs.”24
B. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of
the Defendants, finding that the Plaintiffs’ term mineral interest
had expired.
In Roggow, First Successor Trustee v. Teders,25 the appellants
(plaintiffs below) appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment
Oil Co., No. 118,362, (Okla. Civ. App. Sep. 18, 2020).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 17–18.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 18, 20.
25. Roggow v. Teders, No. 117,569, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Civ. App. Apr. 30,
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order quieting title to certain mineral interests and an oil and gas lease
in the appellees (defendants below). The issue on appeal was whether
the trial court erred in holding that the temporary cessation of
production doctrine resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs’
mineral interests in certain Kingfisher County lands. The mineral
interest at issue was reserved by deed for a period of twenty years and
as long thereafter as minerals are produced. The appellate court stated:
In the present case, the Warranty Deed required
production of oil, gas or other minerals to continue
Plaintiffs’ ownership interest in the mineral estate past
the primary term. It is undisputed the only producing
well on the property ceased to continuously produce,
for multiple periods, during the secondary term.
Pursuant to the dictates of Ludwig, Plaintiffs’ term
mineral interest therefore expired and such interest
reverted to the Defendants. Because Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.26
C. Oklahoma Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, affirmed
trial court’s denial of oil and gas lessors’ claims for reformation
unjust enrichment, and unconscionability
The case of Corbett v. Anadarko E&P Company, LP27 presented the
oil and gas lessor-Corbetts’ appeal of the district court’s rulings in
favor of defendant-Anadarko in the Corbetts’ suit for: (1) reformation
of an oil and gas lease covering Pennsylvania28 lands, (2) denial of a
claim for unjust enrichment, and (3) denial of a claim that the oil and
gas lease at issue was unconscionable.
The court’s opinion described the key factual assertions that led to
this litigation. In 2006, the mineral owner-Corbetts began discussions
with a leasing agent for Anadarko, concerning the proposed granting
of an oil and gas lease covering the Corbetts’ property. The
discussions for the proposed lease involved two tracts of land. The
2020).
26. Id. at 10.
27. Corbett v. Andarko E&P Co., L.P., No. 117,721 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 17,
2020).
28. Id. at 3 n.2 (observing that the tracts are located in Pennsylvania and the
circumstances surrounding execution of the lease occurred in Pennsylvania. The
parties agree that Pennsylvania law controls the parties’ legal relationship).
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“Overton Tract” was jointly owned by the plaintiffs, Kim and Kevin
Corbett (the “Corbetts”). The “Herrick Tract” was owned only by
Kevin Corbett. The two tracts were located approximately twenty
miles apart.
The court of appeals’ opinion describes certain details of the
negotiations, drafting, and revisions to the proposed oil and gas lease,
including that the one oil and gas lease was ultimately drafted to cover
both distinct tracts of land referred to above.29 Testimony presented at
the trial (with summary judgment entered earlier in favor of the other
three defendants) established that it was common practice in
Pennsylvania, and not unlawful, to lease non-contiguous tracts in a
single oil and gas lease. The Corbetts also alleged that they questioned
the approach of having the two distinct tracts covered by a single oil
and gas lease and were assured Anadarko would split the tracts and
account for each tract separately. However, Anadarko’s leasing agent
denied those allegations and stated that she did not have authority to
make any such representations. On June 6, 2006, the Corbetts
executed the oil and gas lease with Anadarko. The court of appeals
then described additional aspects of the factual history of the
underlying dispute in detail.
At the nonjury trial—which occurred over the objection of the
Corbetts—the trial court denied the Corbetts’ claims for reformation
and unjust enrichment and found that the oil and gas lease was
enforceable and not unconscionable. The Corbetts appealed.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals first addressed the Corbetts’ claim
for reformation of the oil and gas lease and damages based on the
alleged false or mistaken representations of the leasing agent.
However, Anadarko denied making any such representations, and the
oil and gas lease provided that any representations would not be
binding. The trial court found that there was no basis for the Corbetts
to seek reformation on the ground of false or mistaken representations.
The trial court stated, “The Corbetts accepted rentals and royalties for
both tracts. They signed the ratification and division order covering
both tracts. Last, they demanded development of the Overton Tract

29. Id. at 3 (indicating that the leasing agent presented the Corbetts with an initial
oil and gas lease form that covered only the Overton Tract. The Corbetts advised
that they wanted to also lease the Herrick Tract. The leasing agent, after checking
title, submitted to the Corbetts a new lease form describing both tracts in the one
lease).
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after expiration of the primary term when the Overton lease would
have terminated unless covered by a single lease.”30
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in
denying the Corbetts’ reformation of the oil and gas lease. The
appellate court further found that the denial of reformation effectively
confirmed the validity of the lease. Regarding the Corbetts’ claim of
alleged unjust enrichment, the court of appeals found that a claim for
unjust enrichment may only arise when a transaction of the parties not
otherwise governed by an express agreement confers a benefit on the
defendant to the plaintiff’s detriment, without any corresponding
exchange of value. “[I]f there is a written contract, it must be
unenforceable before unjust enrichment is available, otherwise the
measure of damages is the damages from breach of contract. The trial
court correctly ruled that given a valid written contract, there is no
claim for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania law.” Finally, the
court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in declining
to find the oil and gas lease unconscionable: “That finding would
depend upon Pennsylvania law and none was cited to so hold . . . . An
Oklahoma Court does not decide new law for another state.”
The court of appeals found that the “Corbetts’ original petition
claims [were] barred by applicable Statutes of Limitations. The facts
of the case clearly show that Corbetts knew of their claim or had
sufficient notice that they had a claim against Anadarko more than five
years prior to filing their lawsuit yet continued to accept payments
from Anadarko.”31 The court of appeals held that the trial court did not
err in its foregoing rulings below. It affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
D. Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Reversed Lower Court Order
Dismissing Claims for Fraud and Related Causes of Action
In Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Wyckoff,32 the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals reviewed Devon’s appeal of the trial court’s
judgment granting Wyckoff’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted under 12 Oklahoma Statutes
section 2012(B)(6).
Devon alleged that the defendants’ attorney “approached Devon
about entering into leases with his two clients regarding lease holdings
30. Id. at 15..
31. Id. at 16–17.
32. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Wyckoff, 457 P. 3d 284, 284 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2019).
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that had recently been released”33 by another company. Devon and the
defendants executed two new oil and gas leases covering land in
Woodward County, Oklahoma. Devon paid almost $1.6 million for
the two leases. The court found that Devon assumed responsibility for
a title search34 and noted that the new lease did not provide any
warranty of title by the defendants. Devon subsequently learned that
Chesapeake’s only interest in the property at issue was a wellbore in
the Wyckoff 2-3 well located on the leased premises. A 1956 lease
covering multiple sections, including the mineral acres Devon
understood it was acquiring under the new lease, was still held by
production from one or more wells. As a result, Wyckoff had no
mineral acres available for lease at the time they entered into the new
leases with Devon. Yet, the defendants argued that because they did
not warrant title to Devon, the defendants should be permitted to keep
the lease payments Devon made.
In the present lawsuit, Devon asserted claims for breach of implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment, actual fraud, constructive fraud,
rescission, and unjust enrichment. The court reviewed Devon’s appeal
under a de novo standard. After reviewing prior, relevant decisions,
the appellate court concluded that the district court’s decision should
be reversed in light of Devon’s allegation of fraud. The court cited
findings in a prior case that “the doctrine of caveat emptor would ‘not
shield a seller from purporting to sell that which he does not have.’”35
Here, Devon alleged the defendants knew or should have known that
the net mineral acres were not available for lease to Devon because
they were covered by the 1956 lease that continued in force and effect
by production.
On the record before it, the court could not determine whether any
fraud was perpetrated; “In light of the uniquely fact-specific fraud
claim presented here, [d]efendants did not meet”36 their burden to
show the legal insufficiency of the petition. The court of civil appeals
reversed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to
dismiss Devon’s petition for allegedly failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The cause was remanded to the district
court for further proceedings.

33. Id. at 285.
34. Id. at 285 n.2 (noting that “Devon’s title search did not reveal an existing
1956 lease at the time the parties entered into the lease agreement.”).
35. French Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Okla. 1991).
36. Wyckoff, 457 P. 3d at 287.
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IV. OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS AND TITLE MATTERS
In late December 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas (Houston Division) in Alta Mesa Holdings, LP v.
Kingfisher Midstream37 held that certain oil and gas gathering
agreements between Alta Mesa (as producer) and Kingfisher (as
gatherer) “ran with the land” under the applicable Oklahoma law and
were not subject to rejection under section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code.38 The court entered summary judgment in favor of Kingfisher
on the issue of rejection.39
V. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, OKLAHOMA SURFACE
DAMAGES ACT, CONDEMNATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. Operator in an Oklahoma Surface Damages Act Proceeding
Demanded a Jury Trial, and the Jury Returned a Verdict More
Favorable to the Operator, the Operator’s claim for Attorney’s
Fees was Denied.
In State of Oklahoma ex rel. Commissioners of the Land Office v.
Stephens and Johnson Operating Co., Inc.,40 the operator appealed the
lower court’s denial of its application for attorney’s fees under
Oklahoma’s Surface Damages Act.41
When the operator and surface owner were unable to reach an
agreement regarding the amount of surface damages incurred by the
surface owner in connection with drilling operations on four oil and
gas wells, the surface owner initiated proceedings under the Surface
Damages Act. The trial court appointed three appraisers to assess the
damages. Two of the three appraisers used a majority report, setting
damages at $450,000.00. The minority appraiser assessed damages in
the much lower amount of $120,515.00. Dissatisfied with the majority
report, the operator demanded a jury trial.
The jury awarded damages in favor of the surface owner in the
amount of $206,192.97. Neither the operator nor the surface owner
37. In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 95 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Tex. 2019).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 2019)
(another decision reaching a similar conclusion under Utah law). But see In re Sabine
Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying Texas law for a
case reaching an opposing outcome).
40. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office v. Stephens & Johnson Operating
Co., 474 P.3d 869, 871 (Okla. 2020).
41. Id. at 870.
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appealed. The operator then filed an application to recover attorney’s
fees and costs in the amount of $359,458.71. The trial court denied the
operator’s request, and the Operator appealed. The Oklahoma Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial of fees and costs. Both the trial court
and the court of appeals found that Oklahoma’s Surface Damages Act
did not provide for an award of fees and costs under the facts of this
case. The court of appeals found that the Surface Damages Act
provides for costs and attorney’s fees to be assessed only when the
party demanding a jury trial fails to obtain a verdict more favorable
than the appraisers’ assessment.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Court of Appeals’ decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found in
part:
Here, the express requirements for Operator’s
requested award of attorney fees and costs under §
318.5(F) have not been satisfied. Under the plain terms
of the Act, only the non-jury demanding party may
recover its fees and costs and only when the jurydemanding party failed to obtain a more favorable
verdict than the appraiser’s award. The terms of §
318.5(F) are equally applicable in their treatment of the
demanding party, regardless of whether a surface
owner or an operator demands the jury trial. This is not
a prevailing party provision. Because Operator was the
jury-demanding party and received a more favorable
verdict, it is not entitled to fees herein under the plain
terms of the SDA.42
The Court proceeded to review in detail a chronology of prior
decisions regarding the award of attorney’s fees in cases under the
Oklahoma Surface Damages Act. That discussion should be reviewed
by any parties who are researching this topic. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court summarized its conclusion as follows:
Operator demanded the jury trial herein and the jury
returned a verdict for less than the amount of the
appraisers’ award, a more favorable result to Operator.
The cases awarding fees and costs to surface owners
42. Id. at 872.
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under § 318.5(F) of the SDA have no application in this
case because that provision is limited to situations
where the jury demanding party fails to obtain a verdict
more favorable than the appraisers’ award. Likewise,
cases awarding attorney fees under § 55(D) to
landowners that obtained a verdict in excess of the
appraisers’ award by 10% are also inapplicable in this
case because that statute allows an award of fees solely
to land owners. Consequently, Operator, the party
demanding the jury trial in this case, is not entitled to
an award of attorney fees under Oklahoma statutory or
case law. The trial court properly denied Operator’s
request for fees and costs.43
The court of appeals’ opinion was withdrawn, and the judgment of the
trial court was affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court
found that cases awarding fees and costs to surface owners under
section 318.5(F) of the Surface Damages Act have no application in
this case because that provision is limited to situations where the jurydemanding party fails to obtain a verdict more favorable than the
appraisers’ award.44
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court Affirmed District Court’s Denial of
Exceptions to Report of Commissioners in Pipeline
Condemnation Action
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America LLC v. Foster OK
Resources LP,45 NGPL condemned easements for access to operate
and maintain two interstate natural gas pipelines and to clear title
issues involving the pipelines. Foster disputed NGPL’s attempted
exercise of eminent domain and asserted that NGPL’s taking did not
meet the legal standard of necessity. However, Foster did not dispute
that NGPL possessed the right of eminent domain where the
prerequisites for eminent domain were present.
The district court appointed three commissioners to determine the
just compensation owed to Foster due to NGPL’s taking of the several
easements. After the commissioners filed their report, Foster filed
exceptions to the report. After conducting a hearing, the district court
43. Id. at 874.
44. Id.
45. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. LLC v. Foster OK Res. LP, 465 P. 3d 1206,
1206 (Okla. 2020).
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overruled Foster’s exceptions; Foster appealed. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court retained the appeal—there was no earlier ruling by an
intermediate appellate court.
In its appeal, Foster first argued that the existing easement
agreements between Foster and NGPL precluded NGPL from seeking
the additional easements through condemnation. Foster argued that
NGPL sought to use eminent domain to bypass the existing easement
agreements and obtain permanent easements that conflicted with and
abrogated the protections negotiated by the parties in the easement
agreements. The Court disagreed and held that the right of
condemnation is inalienable and cannot be waived, contracted away,
or surrendered in whole or in part.46 The Court determined that the
temporary and permanent easements sought by NGPL through this
condemnation proceeding were outside the scope of the existing
easement agreements. The Court added that even if the existing
easement agreements contemplated similar rights, those agreements
did not divest NGPL of its right to eminent domain.
Foster next argued that NGPL’s taking did not meet the legal
standard of necessity for a public use. The Court found that the word
“necessity” in connection with condemnation proceedings does not
mean an absolute necessity but only a reasonable necessity, such as
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property
owner.47 The Court concluded that the taking of the easements through
condemnation was necessary and was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or
an abuse of discretion.
However, Foster asserted that the taking sought through this lawsuit
was not necessary and amounted to fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of
discretion because another optional means of access to the pipelines
was available to NGPL. Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that
it “is well settled in Oklahoma that where a condemner has selected
and designated a route for taking, the courts will not inquire into the
matter to demand why some other route was not chosen.”48 The Court
cited the prior decision in Graham v. Tulsa,49 which discussed the
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Grangeville Highway District
46. Id. at 1210 (citing in support of this holding its prior decision in Burke v.
Okla. City, 250 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1960)).
47. Id. at 1211 (citing White v. Pawhuska, 265 P. 1059, 1062 (Okla. 1928)).
48. Id. (citing Owens v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 283 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. 1954), and
City of Tulsa v. Williams, P. 876, 879 (Okla. 1924)).
49. Id.
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v. Ailshie.50 The Court in Ailshie held that defendants in condemnation
actions cannot prevail merely by showing there is other land in the
immediate neighborhood available and equally useful.51 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that other states similarly held
that simply because some other available route may be sufficient or
may even be more desirable was not adequate to show fraud, bad faith,
or an abuse of discretion. In particular, the Court held that NGPL’s
taking and resort to condemnation did not amount to fraud, bad faith,
or an abuse of discretion merely because other means of access to the
pipelines were available to NGPL.52
In determining the necessity of NGPL’s taking, the Court found that
NGPL’s request for a permanent, nonexclusive easement over Foster’s
road was reasonably necessary and that Foster produced no evidence
indicating that NGPL’s taking was fraudulent, in bad faith, or an abuse
of discretion.
In sum, the court held that: (1) NGPL did not contract away its right
of eminent domain by entering into earlier easement agreements with
Foster; (2) that NGPL had another means of access to its pipelines was
insufficient to show that NGPL’s taking was fraudulent, in bad faith,
or an abuse of discretion; (3) NGPL’s condemnation of Foster’s
property was for a public use and met the legal standard of necessity;
and (4) arguments relating to the necessity of surveying Foster’s
property in computing the just compensation due to Foster were
premature and could not be determined before the anticipated jury trial
on that issue. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling.
VI. OTHER ENERGY INDUSTRY CASES
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s ruling
invalidating a city ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance
conflicted with a state statute. The case of Magnum Energy, Inc. v.
Board of Adjustment for the City of Norman53 presented the review of
a “quasi-judicial administrative decision” from the City of Norman’s
Board of Adjustment (the “Board”). Magnum Energy sought a
variance from a city ordinance requiring umbrella liability insurance
as a condition to issuing a drilling permit within the Norman city
limits. The Board denied the request. Magnum appealed that decision
50. Id.
51. Id. at 720.
52. Grangeville Highway Dist. V. Ailshie, 290 P. 717, 720 (Idaho 1930).
53. Magnum Energy, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Norman, No.
117,912, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Civ. App. June 4, 2020).
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to the Cleveland County District Court. The district court found that
the city ordinance conflicted with a state statute regulating oil and gas
production and was, therefore, invalid as applied to Magnum. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Magnum; the
Board appealed. The court of appeals found that a de novo standard of
review applied in this appeal.
The court of appeals observed at the outset of its decision that “[t]he
dispositive question on appeal is whether there is a conflict between
the [City of Norman’s] ordinance and the state statute.” Citing the
prior decision in Vinson v. Medley,54 the court of appeals found that
“[f]or matters of general statewide concern, a municipal ordinance will
be invalid if it conflicts with a state enactment.”55 The court of appeals
further stated that “[a] city charter supersedes state law only when it
affects a subject that is deemed to lie exclusively within municipal
concern.”56 The court further found “[a] conflict between a state
statute and municipal ordinance exists when ‘both contain either
express or implied conditions that are inconsistent and irreconcilable
with one another. If one is silent on the issue and the other speaks to
it, there can be no conflict.’”57
In the present appeal, the court stated that the ordinance at issue “is
an insurance requirement that must be met for the [c]ity to issue a
permit; it is a business practice safeguarding the health, safety, and
welfare of the [c]ity and its citizens.”58 In contrast, the Oklahoma
statute at issue59 “regulates oilfield operations and allow[s] for
municipal control over indirectly regulated oil and gas operation
concerns of a wellsite, such as public nuisances, property setbacks,
and flood prevention.”60 The court additionally recognized that 17
Oklahoma Statutes section 52 specifies the scope of the Corporation
Commission’s authority. That statute provides that “[t]he Corporation
Commission and incorporated cities and towns shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over permit fees for the drilling and operation of oil and
gas wells.”61
The court of appeals held that the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of oil and gas
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 ((citing Gant v. Okla. City, 6 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Okla. 1931)).
See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020).
Magnum Energy, Inc., No. 117,912 at 5.
Id. at 6.
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regulation did not preclude the city’s ordinance. The court found that
the ordinance was enforceable and that the District Court’s contrary
conclusion was an error and therefore reversed in this appeal.

